Universität zu Köln

Schneider, Cornelius Johannes Franziskus (2021). Three Essays on Experimental Public Economics. PhD thesis, Universität zu Köln.

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Abstract

In its aim to inform optimal tax policies, Public Economics explores the fundamental conflict between “equity”, collecting tax revenues to avail more funds for redistribution via government spending; and “efficiency”, exploiting the full economic potential to maximize overall income. For this, the field of normative Public Economics speaks to the equity side. It raises the question of which redistributive objectives a society wants to realize and how best to achieve them. The field of positive economics, on the other hand, addresses and quantifies the efficiency costs of redistribution. Behavioral responses to taxation are empirically examined to conceptually distinguish the different mechanisms affecting the tax base. This dissertation can be structured along these two dimensions, and consists of three self-contained chapters. With the use of controlled experimental settings, it investigates underlying, more normative preferences and, from an efficiency perspective, revenue implications of tax evasion. Chapter 1 and 2 speak more to the normative pillar and explore public preferences towards taxation of wealth. Specifically, Chapter 1 explores how individuals prefer to tax wealth, asking, aside from misinformation and misperceptions that may play a role, are there any design-specific wealth tax preferences? Further exploring public preferences for wealth taxes, Chapter 2 narrows in on misperceptions about wealth tax instruments. To which extent are misperceptions of fairly complex burden- implications of wealth tax instruments driving preferences for (or against) such taxes? Chapter 3 addresses the positive pillar of Public Economics. It explores potentially positive tax revenue implications of tax evasion. Specifically, it asks: Does a tax system that allows for a certain extent of tax evasion yield efficiency gains beyond what a system with full enforcement would achieve?

Item Type:	Thesis (PhD thesis)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Schneider, Cornelius Johannes Franziskus co.jf.schneider@gmail.com UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
Contributors:	Contribution Name Email Author Chirvi, Malte UNSPECIFIED Author Huber, Hans-Peter UNSPECIFIED Author Mill, Wladislaw UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-533935
Date:	September 2021
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Weitere Institute, Arbeits- und Forschungsgruppen > Center for Macroeconomic Research (CMR) Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professorship for Public Economics
Subjects:	Social sciences Political science Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language Experimental Economics English Public Economics English Optimal Taxation English Wealth Taxation English Preferences for Taxation English Tax Evasion English Tax Revenues English
Date of oral exam:	25 August 2021
Referee:	Name Academic Title Bierbrauer, Felix Prof. Dr. Engel, Christoph Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c.
Funders:	Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/53393