Universität zu Köln

Manjunath, Vikram and Westkamp, Alexander ORCID: 0000-0001-6892-1189 (2021). Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences. J. Econ. Theory, 193. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1095-7235

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Abstract

We study the balanced exchange of indivisible objects without monetary transfers when agents may be endowed with (and consume) more than one object. We propose a natural domain of preferences that we call trichotomous. In this domain, each agent's preference over bundles of objects is responsive to an ordering over objects that has the following three indifference classes, in decreasing order of preferences: desirable objects, objects that she is endowed with but does not consider desirable, and objects that she neither is endowed with nor finds desirable. For this domain, we define a class of individually rational, Pareto-efficient, and strategy-proof mechanisms that are also computationally efficient. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Manjunath, Vikram UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Westkamp, Alexander UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-6892-1189 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-570392
DOI:	10.1016/j.jet.2021.105197
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Theory
Volume:	193
Date:	2021
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication:	SAN DIEGO
ISSN:	1095-7235
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language MARKETS; MANIPULATION; ALLOCATION Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/57039