Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2021). Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information. J. Public Econ., 198. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0047-2727
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Consider two parties who can make non-contractible investments in the provision of a public good. Who should own the physical assets needed to provide the public good? In the literature it has been argued that the party who values the public good most should be the owner, regardless of the investment technologies. Yet, this result has been derived under the assumption of symmetric information. We show that technology matters when the negotiations over the provision of the public good take place under asymmetric information. If party A has a better investment technology, ownership by party A can be optimal even when party B has a larger expected valuation of the public good. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||
Creators: |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-572407 | ||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104424 | ||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | J. Public Econ. | ||||||||
Volume: | 198 | ||||||||
Date: | 2021 | ||||||||
Publisher: | ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA | ||||||||
Place of Publication: | LAUSANNE | ||||||||
ISSN: | 0047-2727 | ||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||
Faculty: | Unspecified | ||||||||
Divisions: | Unspecified | ||||||||
Subjects: | no entry | ||||||||
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
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URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/57240 |
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