Universität zu Köln

Alempaki, Despoina, Colman, Andrew M., Kölle, Felix ORCID: 0000-0003-4036-8566, Loomes, Graham and Pulford, Briony D. (2022). Investigating the failure to best respond in experimental games. Experimental Economics, 25 (2). 656 - 680. DORDRECHT: Springer Science. ISSN 1573-6938

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Abstract

We examine strategic sophistication using eight two-person 3 x 3 one-shot games. To facilitate strategic thinking, we design a 'structured' environment where subjects first assign subjective values to the payoff pairs and state their beliefs about their counterparts' probable strategies, before selecting their own strategies in light of those deliberations. Our results show that a majority of strategy choices are inconsistent with the equilibrium prediction, and that only just over half of strategy choices constitute best responses to subjects' stated beliefs. Allowing for other-regarding considerations increases best responding significantly, but the increase is rather small. We further compare patterns of strategies with those made in an 'unstructured' environment in which subjects are not specifically directed to think strategically. Our data suggest that structuring the pre-decision deliberation process does not affect strategic sophistication.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Alempaki, Despoina UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Colman, Andrew M. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Kölle, Felix koelle@wiso.uni-koeln.de orcid.org/0000-0003-4036-8566 UNSPECIFIED Loomes, Graham UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Pulford, Briony D. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-586155
DOI:	10.1007/s10683-021-09725-8
Journal or Publication Title:	Experimental Economics
Volume:	25
Number:	2
Page Range:	656 - 680
Date:	2022
Publisher:	Springer Science
Place of Publication:	DORDRECHT
ISSN:	1573-6938
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Weitere Institute, Arbeits- und Forschungsgruppen > Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language NORMAL-FORM GAMES; STRATEGIC SOPHISTICATION; INEQUALITY AVERSION; STATED BELIEFS; GUESSING GAMES; PLAYERS MODELS; PREFERENCES; INFORMATION; ATTENTION; FAIRNESS Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/58615