Universität zu Köln

Gogineni, Sridhar, Linn, Scott C. and Yadav, Pradeep K. (2022). Vertical and Horizontal Agency Problems in Private Firms: Ownership Structure and Operating Performance. J. Financ. Quant. Anal., 57 (4). S. 1237 - 1279. NEW YORK: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS. ISSN 1756-6916

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Abstract

We investigate how ownership structure influences operating performance and implied agency costs. Our sample includes over 42,000 U.K. private and public firms. We document several new results of considerable economic significance relating to i) horizontal agency costs arising from unequal ownership within private firms, ii) amplification of agency costs from joint presence within the same firm of horizontal agency problems and vertical agency problems arising from separation of ownership and control, iii) mitigation in agency costs wrought by a second large shareholder, iv) impact of complex ownership structures, and v) agency cost differences between public firms and comparable private firms.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Gogineni, Sridhar UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Linn, Scott C. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Yadav, Pradeep K. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-675917
DOI:	10.1017/S0022109021000363
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Financ. Quant. Anal.
Volume:	57
Number:	4
Page Range:	S. 1237 - 1279
Date:	2022
Publisher:	CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	1756-6916
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; COSTS; LOCATION; MARKET; COMPENSATION; INVESTMENT; DIVIDEND; DECISION; POLICIES Multiple languages Business, Finance; Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/67591