Universität zu Köln

Riehm, Tobias, Fugger, Nicolas, Gillen, Philippe, Gretschko, Vitali and Werner, Peter (2022). Social norms, sanctions, and conditional entry in markets with externalities: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment. J. Public Econ., 212. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0047-2727

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Abstract

In an artefactual field experiment with a large and heterogeneous population sample, we test the impli-cations of social norms for market interactions associated with negative real-world externalities. We run large stylized markets in which sellers and buyers decide whether to enter the market and how much to bid for experimental coupons. Trading leads to profits for sellers and buyers but at the same time destroys donations for a good cause. Calculated over all our treatments, we observe that two-thirds of the participants refuse to trade. Eliciting a controlled measure for conditional moral behavior in one treatment, we find that roughly a quarter of potential traders make their decisions contingent on the decisions of others, indicating that the desire to conform to social norms affects trading decisions in markets with negative externalities. If observers can sanction traders, we find that more than 80% of them are willing to incur personal costs to sanction trading, thus enforcing a social norm for moral behavior.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Riehm, Tobias UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Fugger, Nicolas UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Gillen, Philippe UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Gretschko, Vitali UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Werner, Peter UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-679550
DOI:	10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104701
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Public Econ.
Volume:	212
Date:	2022
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication:	LAUSANNE
ISSN:	0047-2727
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language COOPERATION; BEHAVIOR; ENFORCEMENT; PREFERENCES; PUNISHMENT; GAMES; DETERMINANTS; INFORMATION; RECIPROCITY; STRATEGIES Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/67955