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Conrads, Julian, Ellenberger, Mischa, Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Ohms, Elia Nora, Rilke, Rainer Michael
ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X and Walkowitz, Gari
(2017).
Team Goal Incentives and Individual Lying Behavior.
Working Paper.
Conrads, Julian, Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Reggiani, Tommaso
ORCID: 0000-0002-3134-1049, Rilke, Rainer Michael
ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X and Sliwka, Dirk
ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165
(2016).
How to hire helpers? Evidence from a field experiment.
Experimental Economic, 19 (3).
pp. 577-594.
Springer Science.
ISSN 1386-4157
Conrads, Julian, Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Rilke, Rainer Michael
ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X, Schielke, Anne
ORCID: 0000-0002-1952-4758 and Walkowitz, Gari
(2014).
Honesty in tournaments.
Econ. Lett., 123 (1).
S. 90 - 94.
LAUSANNE:
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA.
ISSN 1873-7374
Conrads, Julian, Reggiani, Tommaso ORCID: 0000-0002-3134-1049 and Rilke, Rainer Michael
ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X
(2016).
Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: evidence from a field experiment.
Appl. Econ. Lett., 23 (3).
S. 206 - 212.
ABINGDON:
ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD.
ISSN 1466-4291
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike, Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Rilke, Rainer Michael
ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X and Walkowitz, Gari
(2018).
Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis.
International Journal of Game Theory, 47 (1).
pp. 301-329.
Springer Nature.
ISSN 0020-7276
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike, Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Rilke, Rainer Michael
ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X and Walkowitz, Gari
(2019).
Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options.
Experimental Economics, 22 (2).
pp. 552-576.
Springer Science.
ISSN 1573-6938
Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Rilke, Rainer Michael
ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X and Walkowitz, Gari
(2019).
Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency.
Experimental Economics, 22 (2).
pp. 552-576.
Springer Science.
ISSN 1573-6938
Leib, Margarita, Köbis, Nils, Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X, Hagens, Marloes and Irlenbusch, Bernd
ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826
(2023).
Corrupted by Algorithms? How AI-generated and Human-written Advice Shape (Dis)honesty.
De.arxiv.org.
Arxiv.org.
Leib, Margarita ORCID: 0000-0003-1447-3186, Köbis, Nils
ORCID: 0000-0002-0608-7333, Rilke, Rainer Michael
ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X, Hagens, Marloes
ORCID: 0000-0003-4584-8892 and Irlenbusch, Bernd
ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826
(2023).
Corrupted by Algorithms? How AI-generated and Human-written Advice Shape (Dis)honesty.
The Economic Journal, 134 (658).
pp. 766-784.
Oxford University Press.
ISSN 0013-0133
Leib, Margarita, Köbis, Nils ORCID: 0000-0002-0608-7333, Rilke, Rainer Michael
ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X, Hagens, Marloes and Irlenbusch, Bernd
ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826
(2021).
The corruptive force of AI-generated advice.
De.arxiv.org.
Arxiv.org.
Lonnqvist, Jan-Erik ORCID: 0000-0001-8292-6090, Rilke, Rainer Michael
ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X and Walkowitz, Gari
(2015).
On why hypocrisy thrives: Reasonable doubt created by moral posturing can deter punishment.
J. Exp. Soc. Psychol., 59.
S. 139 - 146.
SAN DIEGO:
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE.
ISSN 1096-0465
Rilke, Rainer Michael
(2015).
Experiments on Ethical Behavior in Strategic Interactions: Cooperation, Honesty, and Fairness.
PhD thesis, Universität zu Köln.
Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X, Danilov, Anastasia
ORCID: 0000-0003-3662-4897, Irlenbusch, Bernd
ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Weisel, Ori and Shalvi, Shaul
ORCID: 0000-0003-2225-7352
(2018).
The Honest Leader Effect - How Hierarchies Affect Honesty in Groups.
Academy of Management Proceedings, 2018 (1).
p. 10365.
Academy of Management.
ISSN 0065-0668
Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X, Danilov, Anastasia
ORCID: 0000-0003-3662-4897, Weisel, Ori, Shalvi, Shaul
ORCID: 0000-0003-2225-7352 and Irlenbusch, Bernd
ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826
(2021).
When leading by example leads to less corrupt collaboration.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 188.
pp. 288-306.
Elsevier.
ISSN 0167-2681