Universität zu Köln

Goldluecke, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2014). Investments as signals of outside options. J. Econ. Theory, 150. S. 683 - 709. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1095-7235

Goldluecke, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2018). Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments. Eur. Econ. Rev., 110. S. 211 - 223. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1873-572X

Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2011). Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence. Games Econ. Behav., 73 (1). S. 186 - 200. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013). Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study. Rev. Econ. Stud., 80 (4). S. 1516 - 1545. OXFORD: OXFORD UNIV PRESS. ISSN 1467-937X

Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2015). Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory. Games Econ. Behav., 89. S. 17 - 34. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2018). Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory. Games Econ. Behav., 109. S. 544 - 565. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. . How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects*. Scand. J. Econ.. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1467-9442

Kusterer, David ORCID: 0000-0001-8891-4488 and Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2020). Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 177. S. 514 - 533. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

Kusterer, David J. ORCID: 0000-0001-8891-4488 and Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2017). The management of innovation: Experimental evidence. Games Econ. Behav., 104. S. 706 - 726. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

Mueller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2017). Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs. Econ. Lett., 152. S. 88 - 93. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Mueller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2015). Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted. Econ. Lett., 129. S. 116 - 121. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Mueller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2016). Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. Eur. Econ. Rev., 87. S. 92 - 108. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1873-572X

Mueller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2021). The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 184. S. 653 - 670. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

Oechssler, Jörg, Roider, Andreas ORCID: 0000-0003-2151-912X and Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2015). Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 171 (4). pp. 565-588. Mohr Siebeck. ISSN 0932-4569

Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2017). Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. Econ. Lett., 159. S. 96 - 100. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2021). Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 182. S. 100 - 113. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2010). Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments. J. Math. Econ., 46 (5). S. 807 - 817. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0304-4068

Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2015). Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions. J. Public Econ., 132. S. 23 - 32. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0047-2727

Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2022). How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts. Econ. J., 132 (647). S. 2563 - 2578. OXFORD: OXFORD UNIV PRESS. ISSN 1468-0297

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2019). Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership. Econ. Lett., 183. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2017). Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 144. S. 153 - 166. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1879-1751

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2020). Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. Econ. Lett., 186. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2021). On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries. Econ. Lett., 202. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2014). Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered. Econ. Lett., 125 (1). S. 21 - 25. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2021). Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information. J. Public Econ., 198. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0047-2727

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012). Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information. Econ. Lett., 117 (3). S. 642 - 646. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013). Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered. Econ. Lett., 121 (3). S. 533 - 537. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012). The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability. Econ. Lett., 117 (3). S. 841 - 844. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0165-1765

Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2016). The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information. Econ. Lett., 145. S. 33 - 38. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374