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Number of items: 29.

Goldluecke, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2014). Investments as signals of outside options. J. Econ. Theory, 150. S. 683 - 709. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1095-7235

Goldluecke, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2018). Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments. Eur. Econ. Rev., 110. S. 211 - 223. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1873-572X

Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2011). Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence. Games Econ. Behav., 73 (1). S. 186 - 200. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013). Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study. Rev. Econ. Stud., 80 (4). S. 1516 - 1545. OXFORD: OXFORD UNIV PRESS. ISSN 1467-937X

Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2015). Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory. Games Econ. Behav., 89. S. 17 - 34. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2018). Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory. Games Econ. Behav., 109. S. 544 - 565. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. . How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects*. Scand. J. Econ.. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1467-9442

Kusterer, David J. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2020). Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 177. S. 514 - 533. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

Kusterer, David J. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2017). The management of innovation: Experimental evidence. Games Econ. Behav., 104. S. 706 - 726. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

Mueller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2017). Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs. Econ. Lett., 152. S. 88 - 93. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Mueller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2015). Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted. Econ. Lett., 129. S. 116 - 121. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Mueller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2015). Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted. Econ. Lett., 129. S. 116 - 121. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Mueller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2016). Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. Eur. Econ. Rev., 87. S. 92 - 108. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1873-572X

Mueller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2021). The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 184. S. 653 - 670. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

Oechssler, Joerg ORCID: 0000-0003-1418-0842, Roider, Andreas ORCID: 0000-0003-2151-912X and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2015). Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? J. Inst. Theor. Econ.-Z. Gesamte Staatswiss., 171 (4). S. 565 - 589. TUBINGEN: J C B MOHR. ISSN 1614-0559

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2017). Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. Econ. Lett., 159. S. 96 - 100. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2021). Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 182. S. 100 - 113. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2010). Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments. J. Math. Econ., 46 (5). S. 807 - 817. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0304-4068

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2015). Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions. J. Public Econ., 132. S. 23 - 32. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0047-2727

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2019). Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership. Econ. Lett., 183. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2017). Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 144. S. 153 - 166. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1879-1751

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2020). Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. Econ. Lett., 186. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2021). On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries. Econ. Lett., 202. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2014). Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered. Econ. Lett., 125 (1). S. 21 - 25. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2021). Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information. J. Public Econ., 198. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0047-2727

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012). Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information. Econ. Lett., 117 (3). S. 642 - 646. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013). Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered. Econ. Lett., 121 (3). S. 533 - 537. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012). The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability. Econ. Lett., 117 (3). S. 841 - 844. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0165-1765

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2016). The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information. Econ. Lett., 145. S. 33 - 38. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

This list was generated on Tue Jan 31 04:09:04 2023 CET.