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Journal Article
Lee, Matthew Brandon ORCID: 0000-0003-4631-5254 and Silva, Paul ORCID: 0000-0002-0321-1562 (2020). Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology. Episteme. pp. 1-19. ISSN 1742-3600
Lynch, Michael P. and Silva, Paul (2016). Why Worry about Epistemic Circularity? Journal of Philosophical Research, 41. pp. 33-52. ISSN 1053-8364
Silva, Paul (2020). A Bayesian explanation of the irrationality of sexist and racist beliefs involving generic content. Synthese, 197 (6). pp. 2465-2487. ISSN 0039-7857
Silva, Paul (2019). Beliefless Knowing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 100 (3). pp. 723-746. ISSN 0279-0750
Silva, Paul ORCID: 0000-0002-0321-1562 (2018). Can Worsnip's strategy solve the puzzle of misleading higher-order apparent evidence? Inquiry. pp. 1-13. ISSN 0020-174X
Silva, Paul ORCID: 0000-0002-0321-1562 (2015). The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98 (1). pp. 25-48. ISSN 02790750
Silva, Paul (2018). Etiological information and diminishing justification. Inquiry, 61 (2). pp. 115-136. ISSN 0020-174X
Silva, Paul (2018). Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style. Philosophical Studies, 175. pp. 2907-2930. ISSN 0031-8116
Silva, Paul (2017). How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98 (S1). pp. 308-328. ISSN 0279-0750
Silva, Paul (2019). JUSTIFIED GROUP BELIEF IS EVIDENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE GROUP BELIEF. Episteme, 16 (3). pp. 262-281. ISSN 1742-3600
Silva, Paul (2017). KNOWING HOW TO PUT KNOWLEDGE FIRST IN THE THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION. Episteme, 14 (4). pp. 393-412. ISSN 1742-3600
Silva, Paul (2020). Knowledge-First Theories of Justification. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002
Silva, Paul ORCID: 0000-0002-0321-1562 (2020). Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857
Book Section, Proceedings Item or annotation in a legal commentary
Silva, Paul (2020). Debunking Objective Consequentialism. In: Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, pp. 78-96. New York: Routledge. ISBN 9780429325328