Universität zu Köln

Khalmetski, Kiryl and Sliwka, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165 (2019). Disguising Lies-Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games. Am. Econ. J.-Microecon., 11 (4). S. 79 - 112. NASHVILLE: AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. ISSN 1945-7685

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Abstract

We study equilibrium reporting behavior in cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution of reports in line with observed experimental patterns. We also find that higher image concerns lead to an increase in the range of reported lies, while the effect of the fixed cost of lying is the opposite.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Khalmetski, Kiryl UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Sliwka, Dirk UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-8026-0165 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-128315
DOI:	10.1257/mic.20170193
Journal or Publication Title:	Am. Econ. J.-Microecon.
Volume:	11
Number:	4
Page Range:	S. 79 - 112
Date:	2019
Publisher:	AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
Place of Publication:	NASHVILLE
ISSN:	1945-7685
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Business Administration > Corporate Development > Professorship for Business Administration and Human Resources Management
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language INCENTIVES; DECEPTION; TRUTH Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/12831