Universität zu Köln

Khalmetski, Kiryl (2019). Evasion of guilt in expert advice. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 167. S. 296 - 311. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

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Abstract

We develop a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and a partially informed sender who is guilt-averse toward the receiver. The sender's cost of sending a particular message is endogenous, depending on the receiver's beliefs induced by this message rather than on its exogenous formulation. Such preferences lead to the endogenous emergence of evasive communication in that the sender types who prefer not to reveal their information to the receiver pool with uninformed types rather than with types observing different information. As a result, the receiver may prefer an equilibrium with a smaller amount of messages used on the equilibrium path. Besides, dealing with an ex ante less informed sender can be beneficial to the receiver, while the sender himself may want to commit to a smaller ex ante likelihood of being informed. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Khalmetski, Kiryl UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-128568
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.003
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume:	167
Page Range:	S. 296 - 311
Date:	2019
Publisher:	ELSEVIER
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1879-1751
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language INFORMATION; DECEPTION; PROMISES; LIES; COMMUNICATION; COMPETITION; AVERSION Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/12856