Universität zu Köln

Bolton, Gary E., Kusterer, David J. and Mans, Johannes (2019). Inflated Reputations: Uncertainty, Leniency, and Moral Wiggle Room in Trader Feedback Systems. Manage. Sci., 65 (11). S. 5371 - 5392. CATONSVILLE: INFORMS. ISSN 1526-5501

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Abstract

The reputation information provided by market feedback systems tends to be compressed in the sense that reliable and unreliable sellers have similar feedback scores. The experiment presented here features a market in which what a buyer receives is a noisy signal of what was actually sent. We focus on the influence the noise has on endogenously given feedback. The attributional uncertainty creates room for leniency in feedback giving. We find that buyer leniency reduces the informativeness of the feedback system and, in combination with uncertainty, diminishes seller trustworthiness. With a noisy signal, buyers pay about the same prices but get significantly less.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Bolton, Gary E. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Kusterer, David J. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Mans, Johannes UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-129376
DOI:	10.1287/mnsc.2018.3191
Journal or Publication Title:	Manage. Sci.
Volume:	65
Number:	11
Page Range:	S. 5371 - 5392
Date:	2019
Publisher:	INFORMS
Place of Publication:	CATONSVILLE
ISSN:	1526-5501
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PERFORMANCE-APPRAISAL; GAMES; TRUST; PUNISHMENT; MARKETS; IMPACT; PRICE; INSTITUTIONS; INFORMATION; SUPERVISORS Multiple languages Management; Operations Research & Management Science Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/12937