Batrancea, Larissa ORCID: 0000-0001-6254-2970, Nichita, Anca, Olsen, Jerome, Kogler, Christoph ORCID: 0000-0002-8443-6009, Kirchler, Erich, Hoelzl, Erik, Weiss, Avi, Torgler, Benno ORCID: 0000-0002-9809-963X, Fooken, Jonas, Fuller, Joanne, Schaffner, Markus, Banuri, Sheheryar, Hassanein, Medhat, Alarcon-Garcia, Gloria, Aldemir, Ceyhan, Apostol, Oana, Weinberg, Diana Bank, Batrancea, Joan, Belianin, Alexis, Bello Gomez, Felipe de Jesus, Briguglio, Marie, Dermol, Valerij, Doyle, Elaine, Gcabo, Rebone, Gong, Binglin, Ennya, Sara, Essel-Anderson, Anthony ORCID: 0000-0003-4555-0519, Frecknall-Hughes, Jane, Hasanain, Ali, Hizen, Yoichi, Huber, Odilo, Kaplanoglou, Georgia, Kudla, Janusz ORCID: 0000-0003-2485-6877, Lemoine, Jeremy E., Leurcharusmee, Supanika, Matthiasson, Thorolfur ORCID: 0000-0003-3312-386X, Mehta, Sanjeev, Min, Sejin, Naufal, George, Niskanen, Mervi, Nordblom, Katarina, Ozturk, Engin Bagis ORCID: 0000-0002-5596-4099, Pacheco, Luis, Pantya, Jozsef, Rapanos, Vassilis, Roland-Levy, Christine, Roux-Cesar, Ana Maria, Salamzadeh, Aidin ORCID: 0000-0001-6808-1327, Savadori, Lucia ORCID: 0000-0003-3957-3132, Scheibe, Vidar, Sharma, Manoj, Summers, Barbara, Suriya, Komsan, Villegas-Palacio, Clara, Visser, Martine, Xia, Chun, Yi, Sunghwan and Zukauskas, Sarunas (2019). Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations. J. Econ. Psychol., 74. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1872-7719

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Abstract

The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Batrancea, LarissaUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0001-6254-2970UNSPECIFIED
Nichita, AncaUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Olsen, JeromeUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Kogler, ChristophUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-8443-6009UNSPECIFIED
Kirchler, ErichUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Hoelzl, ErikUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Weiss, AviUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Torgler, BennoUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-9809-963XUNSPECIFIED
Fooken, JonasUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Fuller, JoanneUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Schaffner, MarkusUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Banuri, SheheryarUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Hassanein, MedhatUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Alarcon-Garcia, GloriaUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Aldemir, CeyhanUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Apostol, OanaUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Weinberg, Diana BankUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Batrancea, JoanUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Belianin, AlexisUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Bello Gomez, Felipe de JesusUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Briguglio, MarieUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Dermol, ValerijUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Doyle, ElaineUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Gcabo, ReboneUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Gong, BinglinUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Ennya, SaraUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Essel-Anderson, AnthonyUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0003-4555-0519UNSPECIFIED
Frecknall-Hughes, JaneUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Hasanain, AliUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Hizen, YoichiUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Huber, OdiloUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Kaplanoglou, GeorgiaUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Kudla, JanuszUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0003-2485-6877UNSPECIFIED
Lemoine, Jeremy E.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Leurcharusmee, SupanikaUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Matthiasson, ThorolfurUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0003-3312-386XUNSPECIFIED
Mehta, SanjeevUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Min, SejinUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Naufal, GeorgeUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Niskanen, MerviUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Nordblom, KatarinaUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Ozturk, Engin BagisUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-5596-4099UNSPECIFIED
Pacheco, LuisUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Pantya, JozsefUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Rapanos, VassilisUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Roland-Levy, ChristineUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Roux-Cesar, Ana MariaUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Salamzadeh, AidinUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0001-6808-1327UNSPECIFIED
Savadori, LuciaUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0003-3957-3132UNSPECIFIED
Scheibe, VidarUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Sharma, ManojUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Summers, BarbaraUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Suriya, KomsanUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Villegas-Palacio, ClaraUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Visser, MartineUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Xia, ChunUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Yi, SunghwanUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Zukauskas, SarunasUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-131971
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2019.102191
Journal or Publication Title: J. Econ. Psychol.
Volume: 74
Date: 2019
Publisher: ELSEVIER
Place of Publication: AMSTERDAM
ISSN: 1872-7719
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
EVASION; PUNISHMENT; AUDITMultiple languages
Economics; Psychology, MultidisciplinaryMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/13197

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