Universität zu Köln

Abbink, Klaus and Doğan, Gönül ORCID: 0000-0002-1075-1102 (2019). How to choose your victim. Games and Economic Behavior, 113. 482 - 497. SAN DIEGO: Elsevier. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We introduce the experimental mobbing game. Each player in a group has the option to nominate one of the other players or to nominate no one. If the same person is nominated by all other players, he loses his payoff and the mob gains. We conduct three sets of experiments to study the effects of monetary gains, fear of being mobbed, and different types of focality. In the repeated mobbing game, we find that subjects frequently coordinate on selecting a victim, even for modest gains. Higher gains make mobbing more likely. We find no evidence that fear of becoming the victim explains mobbing. Richer and poorer players are equally focal. Pity plays no role in mobbing decisions. Ingroup members - introduced by colours - are less likely to be victims, and both payoff difference and colour difference serve as strong coordination devices. Commonly employed social preference theories do not explain our findings. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Abbink, Klaus UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Doğan, Gönül UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-1075-1102 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-139297
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.006
Journal or Publication Title:	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume:	113
Page Range:	482 - 497
Date:	2019
Publisher:	Elsevier
Place of Publication:	SAN DIEGO
ISSN:	0899-8256
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Business Administration > Corporate Development > Professorship for Corporate Development & Corporate Responsibility
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY; COORDINATION GAMES; COMMUNICATION; SELECTION; SPITE Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/13929