Lu, Yixin ORCID: 0000-0001-6515-1940, Gupta, Alok ORCID: 0000-0002-2097-1643, Ketter, Wolfgang ORCID: 0000-0001-9008-142X and van Heckd, Eric (2019). Information Transparency in Business-to-Business Auction Markets: The Role of Winner Identity Disclosure. Manage. Sci., 65 (9). S. 4261 - 4280. CATONSVILLE: INFORMS. ISSN 1526-5501

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Abstract

One of the central issues in auction design is how much information should be disclosed to bidders. In this paper, we examine bidder's identity disclosure in sequential business-to-business (B2B) auctions. Specifically, we compare two information disclosure policies, one that publicly discloses winners' identities (the status quo) and an alternative policy that conceals winners' identities. Using a large-scale field experiment in the Dutch flower auction market, we find that concealing winners' identities can significantly increase the average winning price and thereby raise the seller's revenue. We further explore the underlying mechanism that drives the observed effect. The empirical analysis of bidding behavior in these auctions suggests that bidders tend to imitate some of their competitors who have won in previous rounds of auctions and shade their bids accordingly. Concealing winners' identities can disrupt such imitation heuristic, which in turn mitigates the price-declining trend in sequential rounds. Our findings have important implications for the design of information disclosure policies in B2B auction markets.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Lu, YixinUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0001-6515-1940UNSPECIFIED
Gupta, AlokUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-2097-1643UNSPECIFIED
Ketter, WolfgangUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0001-9008-142XUNSPECIFIED
van Heckd, EricUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-142655
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3143
Journal or Publication Title: Manage. Sci.
Volume: 65
Number: 9
Page Range: S. 4261 - 4280
Date: 2019
Publisher: INFORMS
Place of Publication: CATONSVILLE
ISSN: 1526-5501
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
SEALED BID AUCTIONS; LINKAGE PRINCIPLE; COMPARING OPEN; DESIGN; MULTIUNIT; COLLUSION; FEEDBACKMultiple languages
Management; Operations Research & Management ScienceMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/14265

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