Sauermann, Jan ORCID: 0000-0002-7673-6407 (2018). Do Individuals Value Distributional Fairness? How Inequality Affects Majority Decisions. Polit. Behav., 40 (4). S. 809 - 830. NEW YORK: SPRINGER/PLENUM PUBLISHERS. ISSN 1573-6687

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Abstract

The so-called chaos theorems imply that, under most preference configurations, majority voting in n-dimensional policy spaces is theoretically unrestricted. Empirical research, however, shows an apparent stability of democratic decisions. Recent theoretical developments have emphasized social preferences as a possible explanation for overcoming majority rule's instability problem. Hence, it is assumed that individuals not only maximize their own well-being, but also value distributional fairness. However, there is little experimental research into the influence of social preferences on majority decisions. This article presents findings from laboratory experiments on majority decisions in two-dimensional policy spaces with a systematic variation of the fairness properties of the incentive structures. The results show that distributional fairness is an important motivational factor in democratic decisions.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Sauermann, JanUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-7673-6407UNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-164825
DOI: 10.1007/s11109-017-9424-6
Journal or Publication Title: Polit. Behav.
Volume: 40
Number: 4
Page Range: S. 809 - 830
Date: 2018
Publisher: SPRINGER/PLENUM PUBLISHERS
Place of Publication: NEW YORK
ISSN: 1573-6687
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
MULTIDIMENSIONAL VOTING MODELS; SOCIAL PREFERENCES; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; COMPETITIVE SOLUTION; RATIONAL CHOICE; AGENDA CONTROL; RULE; RECIPROCITY; COOPERATION; GAMESMultiple languages
Political ScienceMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/16482

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