Universität zu Köln

Conway, Paul, Goldstein-Greenwood, Jacob, Polacek, David and Greene, Joshua D. (2018). Sacrificial utilitarian judgments do reflect concern for the greater good: Clarification via process dissociation and the judgments of philosophers. Cognition, 179. S. 241 - 266. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1873-7838

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Abstract

Researchers have used sacrificial trolley-type dilemmas (where harmful actions promote the greater good) to model competing influences on moral judgment: affective reactions to causing harm that motivate characteristically deontological judgments (the ends don't justify the means) and deliberate cost-benefit reasoning that motivates characteristically utilitarian judgments (better to save more lives). Recently, Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, and Savulescu (2015) argued that sacrificial judgments reflect antisociality rather than genuine utilitarianism, but this work employs a different definition of utilitarian judgment. We introduce a five-level taxonomy of utilitarian judgment and clarify our longstanding usage, according to which judgments are utilitarian simply because they favor the greater good, regardless of judges' motivations or philosophical commitments. Moreover, we present seven studies revisiting Kahane and colleagues' empirical claims. Studies 1a-1b demonstrate that dilemma judgments indeed relate to utilitarian philosophy, as philosophers identifying as utilitarian/consequentialist were especially likely to endorse utilitarian sacrifices. Studies 2-6 replicate, clarify, and extend Kahane and colleagues' findings using process dissociation to independently assess deontological and utilitarian response tendencies in lay people. Using conventional analyses that treat deontological and utilitarian responses as diametric opposites, we replicate many of Kahane and colleagues' key findings. However, process dissociation reveals that antisociality predicts reduced deontological inclinations, not increased utilitarian inclinations. Critically, we provide evidence that lay people's sacrificial utilitarian judgments also reflect moral concems about minimizing harm. This work clarifies the conceptual and empirical links between moral philosophy and moral psychology and indicates that sacrificial utilitarian judgments reflect genuine moral concern, in both philosophers and ordinary people.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Conway, Paul UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Goldstein-Greenwood, Jacob UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Polacek, David UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Greene, Joshua D. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-172281
DOI:	10.1016/j.cognition.2018.04.018
Journal or Publication Title:	Cognition
Volume:	179
Page Range:	S. 241 - 266
Date:	2018
Publisher:	ELSEVIER
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1873-7838
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language MORAL DECISION-MAKING; INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES; DILEMMAS; RESPONSES; CONDEMNATION; PERSONALITY; EXPERTISE; FRAMEWORK; AVERSION; BEHAVIOR Multiple languages Psychology, Experimental Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/17228