Universität zu Köln

Berger, Sebastian, Feldhaus, Christoph and Ockenfels, Axel ORCID: 0000-0003-1456-0191 (2018). A shared identity promotes herding in an information cascade game. J. Econ. Sci. Assoc.-JESA, 4 (1). S. 63 - 73. NEW YORK: SPRINGER. ISSN 2199-6784

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Abstract

Our research addresses the effect of shared vs. mixed group identities in an information cascade game. We vary whether subjects always choose after a decision maker who shares the same identity or after a decision maker with a different identity. We find that subjects' inclination to follow their predecessor is stronger in groups uniquely consisting of ingroup members compared to mixed groups. We relate this result to recent social cognition research.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Berger, Sebastian UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Feldhaus, Christoph UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Ockenfels, Axel UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-1456-0191 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-181868
DOI:	10.1007/s40881-018-0050-9
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Sci. Assoc.-JESA
Volume:	4
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 63 - 73
Date:	2018
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	2199-6784
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professur für Economics, Design and Behavior Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS; FOLLOW OTHERS; BEHAVIOR; DIVERSITY; GENDER; MODELS; IMPACT Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/18186