Universität zu Köln

de Quidt, Jonathan, Fallucchi, Francesco ORCID: 0000-0001-5502-4358, Koelle, Felix, Nosenzo, Daniele and Quercia, Simone (2017). Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing? J. Econ. Sci. Assoc.-JESA, 3 (2). S. 174 - 183. NEW YORK: SPRINGER. ISSN 2199-6784

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments, subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus/avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments, subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail to observe a contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty contracts.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code de Quidt, Jonathan UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Fallucchi, Francesco UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-5502-4358 UNSPECIFIED Koelle, Felix UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Nosenzo, Daniele UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Quercia, Simone UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-208354
DOI:	10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Sci. Assoc.-JESA
Volume:	3
Number:	2
Page Range:	S. 174 - 183
Date:	2017
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	2199-6784
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/20835