Universität zu Köln

Cramton, Peter ORCID: 0000-0001-8621-1092 and Ockenfels, Axel ORCID: 0000-0003-1456-0191 (2017). The German 4G Spectrum Auction: Design and Behavior. Econ. J., 127 (605). S. F305 - 20. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1468-0297

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Abstract

The 2010 German 4G spectrum auction was an unusually large simultaneous ascending multi-band auction. The bidding was competitive and the final assignment was efficient. However, our analysis suggests that independent and rational bidders had an opportunity to coordinate implicitly on a low-revenue outcome. Coordination was difficult, though, because of a multiplicity of focal points. One important focal point involved post-auction negotiations, posing risks to bidders and the auctioneer. We analyse different bidding scenarios and how post-auction negotiations can affect values, bidding and efficiency. We also discuss how the simultaneous ascending auction format can be augmented to mitigate the risks.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Cramton, Peter UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-1092 UNSPECIFIED Ockenfels, Axel UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-1456-0191 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-214686
DOI:	10.1111/ecoj.12406
Journal or Publication Title:	Econ. J.
Volume:	127
Number:	605
Page Range:	S. F305 - 20
Date:	2017
Publisher:	WILEY
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1468-0297
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professur für Economics, Design and Behavior Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language MULTIUNIT AUCTIONS; RESALE OPPORTUNITIES; DEMAND REDUCTION; PRICE; UNCERTAINTY; CARBON; INFORMATION; COOPERATION; ELECTRICITY; RECIPROCITY Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/21468