Balafoutas, Loukas ORCID: 0000-0002-3477-5096 and Sutter, Matthias ORCID: 0000-0002-6143-8706 (2017). On the nature of guilt aversion: Insights from a new methodology in the dictator game. J. Behav. Exp. Financ., 13. S. 9 - 16. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 2214-6369

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Abstract

The theory of guilt aversion has been shown to influence human behavior in many contexts. It suggests that an agent's actions are influenced by his perception of other agents' expectations, thus linking behavior to second order beliefs. We use a novel methodology to construct a proxy for second order beliefs through information revelation in an experimental dictator game, in which we inform dictators about the transfers received by each of their partners in the past. This methodology has certain advantages: in particular, it does not suffer from a false consensus effect and does not require withholding information from subjects. Our findings show that the effect of guilt aversion on giving depends on communication. In the baseline treatment, our proxy for beliefs cannot predict transfers. However, behavior is consistent with guilt aversion when communication between dictators and recipients takes place. Hence, our results highlight the sensitivity of guilt aversion to context. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Balafoutas, LoukasUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-3477-5096UNSPECIFIED
Sutter, MatthiasUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-6143-8706UNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-239094
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2016.12.001
Journal or Publication Title: J. Behav. Exp. Financ.
Volume: 13
Page Range: S. 9 - 16
Date: 2017
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Place of Publication: AMSTERDAM
ISSN: 2214-6369
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
PRISONERS-DILEMMA; SOCIAL-INFLUENCE; BELIEFS; PROMISES; COMMUNICATION; RECIPROCITYMultiple languages
Business, FinanceMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/23909

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