Universität zu Köln

Horvath, Joachim ORCID: 0000-0003-2713-5135 and Wiegmann, Alex ORCID: 0000-0002-1492-9780 (2016). Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge. Philos. Stud., 173 (10). S. 2701 - 2727. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-0883

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Abstract

Experimental restrictionists have challenged philosophers' reliance on intuitions about thought experiment cases based on experimental findings. According to the expertise defense, only the intuitions of philosophical experts count-yet the bulk of experimental philosophy consists in studies with lay people. In this paper, we argue that direct (experimental) strategies for assessing the expertise defense are preferable to indirect (inductive) strategies. A direct argument in support of the expertise defense would have to show: first, that there is a significant difference between expert and lay intuitions; second, that expert intuitions are superior to lay intuitions; and third, that expert intuitions accord with the relevant philosophical consensus. At present, there is only little experimental evidence that bears on these issues. To advance the debate, we conducted two new experiments on intuitions about knowledge with experts and lay people. Our results suggest that the intuitions of epistemological experts are superior in some respects, but they also pose an unexpected challenge to the expertise defense. Most strikingly, we found that even epistemological experts tend to ascribe knowledge in fake-barn-style cases. This suggests that philosophy, as a discipline, might fail to adequately map the intuitions of its expert practitioners onto a disciplinary consensus.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Horvath, Joachim UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-2713-5135 UNSPECIFIED Wiegmann, Alex UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-1492-9780 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-260982
DOI:	10.1007/s11098-016-0627-1
Journal or Publication Title:	Philos. Stud.
Volume:	173
Number:	10
Page Range:	S. 2701 - 2727
Date:	2016
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	DORDRECHT
ISSN:	1573-0883
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY; EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS; MORAL RESPONSIBILITY; BIAS; JUDGMENTS; GETTIER Multiple languages Philosophy Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/26098