Schier, Uta K., Ockenfels, Axel ORCID: 0000-0003-1456-0191 and Hofmann, Wilhelm ORCID: 0000-0003-0295-4679 (2016). Moral values and increasing stakes in a dictator game. J. Econ. Psychol., 56. S. 107 - 116. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1872-7719

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Abstract

Using data from a large representative US sample (N=1519), we compare hypothetical moral fairness values from the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale with actual fairness behavior in an incentivized dictator game with either low or high stakes. We find that people with high moral fairness values fail to live up to their high fairness standards, when stake size increases. This violates principles from consistency theories according to which moral values are supposedly aligned with moral behavior, but is in line with temptation theories that question the absoluteness of morality values. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Schier, Uta K.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Ockenfels, AxelUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0003-1456-0191UNSPECIFIED
Hofmann, WilhelmUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0003-0295-4679UNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-261165
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2016.06.004
Journal or Publication Title: J. Econ. Psychol.
Volume: 56
Page Range: S. 107 - 116
Date: 2016
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Place of Publication: AMSTERDAM
ISSN: 1872-7719
Language: English
Faculty: Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions: Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professur für Economics, Design and Behavior
Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects: Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
SELF; FAIRNESS; PREFERENCES; INCENTIVES; PSYCHOLOGY; HYPOCRISYMultiple languages
Economics; Psychology, MultidisciplinaryMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/26116

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