Schmitz, Patrick W. 
ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102
(2016).
The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information.
Econ. Lett., 145.
S. 33 - 38.
LAUSANNE:
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA.
ISSN 1873-7374
Abstract
Two parties can at some future date 2 negotiate about whether or not to collaborate in order to generate a surplus. Yet, the negotiation stage will be reached only if at date 1 both parties pay their respective transaction costs. We show that the expected total surplus may be larger when at date 1 the parties do not yet know the size of the surplus that can be generated at date 2. Moreover, joint ownership can be optimal under incomplete information even when it would be suboptimal under complete information. (C) 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||
| Creators: |
|
||||||||
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-268181 | ||||||||
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.009 | ||||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Econ. Lett. | ||||||||
| Volume: | 145 | ||||||||
| Page Range: | S. 33 - 38 | ||||||||
| Date: | 2016 | ||||||||
| Publisher: | ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA | ||||||||
| Place of Publication: | LAUSANNE | ||||||||
| ISSN: | 1873-7374 | ||||||||
| Language: | English | ||||||||
| Faculty: | Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences | ||||||||
| Divisions: | Center of Excellence C-SEB | ||||||||
| Subjects: | Economics | ||||||||
| Uncontrolled Keywords: |
|
||||||||
| Refereed: | Yes | ||||||||
| URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/26818 |
Downloads
Downloads per month over past year
Altmetric
Export
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |