Schmitz, Patrick W. (2016). The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information. Econ. Lett., 145. S. 33 - 38. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

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Abstract

Two parties can at some future date 2 negotiate about whether or not to collaborate in order to generate a surplus. Yet, the negotiation stage will be reached only if at date 1 both parties pay their respective transaction costs. We show that the expected total surplus may be larger when at date 1 the parties do not yet know the size of the surplus that can be generated at date 2. Moreover, joint ownership can be optimal under incomplete information even when it would be suboptimal under complete information. (C) 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Schmitz, Patrick W.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-268181
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.009
Journal or Publication Title: Econ. Lett.
Volume: 145
Page Range: S. 33 - 38
Date: 2016
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication: LAUSANNE
ISSN: 1873-7374
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
PROPERTY-RIGHTS APPROACH; REFERENCE POINTS; FIRM; OWNERSHIPMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/26818

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