Universität zu Köln

Hoffmann-Kolss, Vera (2016). Of brains and planets: on a causal criterion for mind-brain identities. Synthese, 193 (4). S. 1177 - 1190. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-0964

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Whether mental properties are identical with neural properties is one of the central questions of contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers agree that even if mental properties are identical with neural properties, the mind-brain identity thesis cannot be established on empirical grounds, but only be vindicated by theoretical philosophical considerations. In his paper 'When Is a Brain Like the Planet?', Clark Glymour proposes a causal criterion for local property identifications and claims that this criterion can be used to empirically establish local identities between mental and neural properties. If successful, such an account would settle the debate on the mind-body problem. In this paper, I argue that Glymour's approach falls short of its aims. The causal criterion which he proposes does not provide a sufficient condition for the local identification of properties. Moreover, his account does not succeed in rendering local mind-brain identities empirically testable. Therefore, the mind-body problem cannot be solved as easily as Glymour assumes.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Hoffmann-Kolss, Vera UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-279389
DOI:	10.1007/s11229-015-0671-y
Journal or Publication Title:	Synthese
Volume:	193
Number:	4
Page Range:	S. 1177 - 1190
Date:	2016
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	DORDRECHT
ISSN:	1573-0964
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language MULTIPLE REALIZATION; SENSATIONS Multiple languages History & Philosophy Of Science; Philosophy Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/27938