Universität zu Köln

Fugger, Nicolas, Katok, Elena and Wambach, Achim (2016). Collusion in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Reverse Auctions. Manage. Sci., 62 (2). S. 518 - 534. CATONSVILLE: INFORMS. ISSN 1526-5501

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Abstract

Although binding reverse auctions have attracted a good deal of interest in the academic literature, in practice, dynamic nonbinding reverse auctions are the norm in procurement. In those, suppliers submit price quotes and can respond to quotes of their competitors during a live auction event. However, the lowest quote does not necessarily determine the winner. The buyer decides after the contest, taking further supplier information into account, on who will be awarded the contract. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that this bidding format enables suppliers to collude, thus leading to noncompetitive prices.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Fugger, Nicolas UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Katok, Elena UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Wambach, Achim UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-286553
DOI:	10.1287/mnsc.2014.2142
Journal or Publication Title:	Manage. Sci.
Volume:	62
Number:	2
Page Range:	S. 518 - 534
Date:	2016
Publisher:	INFORMS
Place of Publication:	CATONSVILLE
ISSN:	1526-5501
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PRICE; DESIGN; 2ND-PRICE Multiple languages Management; Operations Research & Management Science Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/28655