Universität zu Köln

Koelle, Felix, Sliwka, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165 and Zhou, Nannan (2016). Heterogeneity, inequity aversion, and group performance. Soc Choice Welf., 46 (2). S. 263 - 287. NEW YORK: SPRINGER. ISSN 1432-217X

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Abstract

We investigate the effects of inequality in wealth on the incentives to contribute to a group output when agents are inequity averse and may differ in ability. We show that equality may lead to a reduction of contributions below levels generated by purely selfish agents. But introducing inequality motivates more productive agents to exert higher efforts and help the group to coordinate on equilibria with less free-riding. As a result, less able agents may benefit from initially disadvantageous inequality. Moreover, the more inequity averse the agents, the more inequality should be imposed even by an egalitarian social planner.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Koelle, Felix UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Sliwka, Dirk UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-8026-0165 UNSPECIFIED Zhou, Nannan UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-286682
DOI:	10.1007/s00355-015-0912-5
Journal or Publication Title:	Soc Choice Welf.
Volume:	46
Number:	2
Page Range:	S. 263 - 287
Date:	2016
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	1432-217X
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PUBLIC-GOODS; PRIVATE PROVISION; TEAM INCENTIVES; FAIRNESS; PREFERENCES; GAMES; COMMUNICATION; PAY; REDISTRIBUTION; PRODUCTIVITY Multiple languages Economics; Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/28668