Universität zu Köln

Belot, Michele and Schroeder, Marina (2016). The Spillover Effects of Monitoring: A Field Experiment. Manage. Sci., 62 (1). S. 37 - 46. CATONSVILLE: INFORMS. ISSN 1526-5501

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Abstract

We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multidimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivized. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the direct effects of monitoring and penalizing mistakes on work quality and evaluate spillovers on unmonitored dimensions of productivity ( punctuality and theft). We find that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are harsh, but substantially reduces punctuality irrespectively of the associated incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with 10% of participants stealing overall. Our findings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Belot, Michele UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Schroeder, Marina UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-290529
DOI:	10.1287/mnsc.2014.2089
Journal or Publication Title:	Manage. Sci.
Volume:	62
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 37 - 46
Date:	2016
Publisher:	INFORMS
Place of Publication:	CATONSVILLE
ISSN:	1526-5501
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language HIDDEN COSTS; WORK EFFORT; NORMS; TRUST Multiple languages Management; Operations Research & Management Science Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/29052