Silva, Paul, Jr. . Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach. Synthese. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. On virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that knowing P is a kind of non-accidental true representation that P. I outline a novel theory of the epistemic requirement on possession in terms of this more general state of non-accidental true representation. It is just as well placed to explain the motivations behind knowledge-centric views of possession, and it is also better placed to explain the extent of the reasons we possess in certain cases of deductive belief-updates and cases involving environmental luck. I conclude with three reflections. First, I indicate how my arguments generate a dilemma for Errol Lord's (2018a) view that possessing reasons is just a matter of being in a position to manifest one's knowledge how to use them. Second, I explain how my view can simultaneously manage cases of environmental luck without falling prey to lottery cases. Finally, I sketch the direction for a further range of counterexamples to knowledge-centric theories of possession.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Silva, Paul, Jr.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-308635
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-020-02916-5
Journal or Publication Title: Synthese
Publisher: SPRINGER
Place of Publication: DORDRECHT
ISSN: 1573-0964
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
History & Philosophy Of Science; PhilosophyMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/30863

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