A deference model of epistemic authority - Kölner UniversitätsPublikationsServer

Bokros, Sofia Ellinor . A deference model of epistemic authority. Synthese. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-0964

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

How should we adjust our beliefs in light of the testimony of those who are in a better epistemic position than ourselves, such as experts and other epistemic superiors? In this paper, I develop and defend a deference model of epistemic authority. The paper attempts to resolve the debate between the preemption view and the total evidence view of epistemic authority by taking an accuracy-first approach to the issue of how we should respond to authoritative and expert testimony. I argue that when we look at the debate through the lens of accuracy, it becomes clear that matters are more complicated than either the preemption view or the total evidence view are able to account for. Consequently, a deference model, outlined within a credence-based framework, does a better job of capturing the relevant phenomena, and explaining how we should update our beliefs in response to epistemically authoritative testimony.

Item Type:

Journal Article

Creators: