Universität zu Köln

Grunewald, Andreas, Hansen, Emanuel ORCID: 0000-0003-3070-997X and Poenitzsch, Gert (2020). Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power. Econ. Theory, 70 (1). S. 273 - 312. NEW YORK: SPRINGER. ISSN 1432-0479

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Abstract

We study how policy choice and political selection are affected by the concentration of political power. In a setting with inefficient policy gambles, variations in power concentration give rise to a trade-off. On the one hand, power-concentrating institutions allocate more power to the voters' preferred candidate. On the other hand, they induce the adoption of more overly risky policies and decrease the voters' capability to select well-suited politicians. We show that full concentration of power is optimal if and only if the conflict of interest between voters and politicians is small. Otherwise, an intermediate level of power concentration is optimal.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Grunewald, Andreas UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Hansen, Emanuel UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-3070-997X UNSPECIFIED Poenitzsch, Gert UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-328235
DOI:	10.1007/s00199-019-01210-x
Journal or Publication Title:	Econ. Theory
Volume:	70
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 273 - 312
Date:	2020
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	1432-0479
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language VETO PLAYERS; ACCOUNTABILITY; COMPETITION; SEPARATION Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/32823