Universität zu Köln

Betzer, Andre, Lee, Hye Seung (Grace), Limbach, Peter and Salas, Jesus M. (2020). Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers. J. Financ. Quant. Anal., 55 (2). S. 581 - 620. NEW YORK: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS. ISSN 1756-6916

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This study finds a positive, economically meaningful impact of generalist chief executive officers (CEOs) on shareholder value using 164 sudden deaths and 345 non-sudden exogenous turnovers. The higher a departing CEO's general ability index (GAI), independently and relative to her successor, the lower is the abnormal stock return to turnover announcements. Returns reflect post-turnover changes in operating performance. Further, CEOs' and successors' GAIs are significantly positively related, but only for non-sudden turnovers. Consistently, for sudden deaths, we find positive stock returns to appointments of generalist successors. The results provide a market-based explanation for the generalist pay premium.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Betzer, Andre UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Lee, Hye Seung (Grace) UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Limbach, Peter UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Salas, Jesus M. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-343719
DOI:	10.1017/S0022109018001400
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Financ. Quant. Anal.
Volume:	55
Number:	2
Page Range:	S. 581 - 620
Date:	2020
Publisher:	CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	1756-6916
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language CEO PAY; WORK EXPERIENCE; FIRM; MARKET; DEATHS; SPECIALISTS; GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP; DIRECTORS; IMPACT Multiple languages Business, Finance; Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/34371