Universität zu Köln

DeVaro, Jed ORCID: 0000-0003-4849-1489 and Gürtler, Oliver ORCID: 0000-0001-7792-5325 (2020). Strategic shirking in competitive labor markets: A general model of multi-task promotion tournaments with employer learning. J. Econ. Manage. Strategy, 29 (2). 335 - 376. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1530-9134

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Abstract

In a multitask, market-based promotion tournament model, under different environments concerning employer learning about worker ability, it is shown that: (a) asymmetric learning in multitask jobs is a necessary condition for strategic shirking (i.e., underperforming on certain tasks to increase the promotion probability); (b) when learning becomes increasingly symmetric on one task, the effort allocated to that task could increase or decrease, but effort on the other task increases; (c) strategic shirking does not occur in equilibrium in single-task models; and (d) promotions signal worker ability even when there is symmetric learning on one task, if learning is asymmetric on another.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code DeVaro, Jed UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-4849-1489 UNSPECIFIED Gürtler, Oliver UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-7792-5325 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-344196
DOI:	10.1111/jems.12342
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Manage. Strategy
Volume:	29
Number:	2
Page Range:	335 - 376
Date:	2020
Publisher:	WILEY
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1530-9134
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Economics
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language INTERNAL PROMOTION; JOB ASSIGNMENT; WAGE POLICY; INCENTIVES; DYNAMICS; DISCRIMINATION; COMPENSATION; PERFORMANCE; CONTRACTS; SKILLS English Economics; Management English
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/34419