Jann, Ole ORCID: 0000-0002-6198-3819 and Schottmüller, Christoph ORCID: 0000-0001-6059-1090 (2020). An informational theory of privacy. Econ. J., 130 (625). S. 93 - 125. OXFORD: OXFORD UNIV PRESS. ISSN 1468-0297

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Abstract

Privacy of consumers or citizens is often seen as an inefficient information asymmetry. We challenge this view by showing that privacy can increase welfare in an informational sense. It can also improve information aggregation and prevent inefficient statistical discrimination. We show how and when the different informational effects of privacy line up to make privacy efficient or even Pareto-optimal. Our theory can be applied to decide who should have which information and how privacy and information disclosure should be regulated. We discuss applications to online privacy, credit decisions and transparency in government.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Jann, OleUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-6198-3819UNSPECIFIED
Schottmüller, ChristophUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0001-6059-1090UNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-350642
DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez045
Journal or Publication Title: Econ. J.
Volume: 130
Number: 625
Page Range: S. 93 - 125
Date: 2020
Publisher: OXFORD UNIV PRESS
Place of Publication: OXFORD
ISSN: 1468-0297
Language: English
Faculty: Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions: Center of Excellence C-SEB
Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Microeconomics
Subjects: Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
CONSUMER PRIVACY; ECONOMICS; MARKETSMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/35064

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