Universität zu Köln

Kampkoetter, Patrick (2015). Non-executive compensation in German and Swiss banks before and after the financial crisis. Eur. J. Financ., 21 (15). S. 1297 - 1317. ABINGDON: ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD. ISSN 1466-4364

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Abstract

We provide an extensive overview of the determinants of compensation schemes for non-executive employees in the German and Swiss financial services industry. We analyze how pay systems adjust in the aftermath of the financial crisis and find that the crisis had a deep impact on short-term bonus payments. Our results indicate that restrictions on bonus payments may lead to higher fixed salaries and, hence, to a lower performance sensitivity of compensation. We also show that fixed compensation packages are highly standardized between banks, whereas bonus payments are more strongly related to differences between individuals. In Germany, bonuses vary to a higher extent across companies, whereas in Swiss banks, the differences are almost negligible when adding firm controls.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Kampkoetter, Patrick UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-383841
DOI:	10.1080/1351847X.2014.947002
Journal or Publication Title:	Eur. J. Financ.
Volume:	21
Number:	15
Page Range:	S. 1297 - 1317
Date:	2015
Publisher:	ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
Place of Publication:	ABINGDON
ISSN:	1466-4364
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PERSONNEL DATA; MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION; INTERNAL ECONOMICS; AGENCY-THEORY; WAGE POLICY; PERFORMANCE; PAY; INCENTIVES; FIRMS; TOURNAMENTS Multiple languages Business, Finance Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/38384