Universität zu Köln

Dutcher, E. Glenn, Balafoutas, Loukas ORCID: 0000-0002-3477-5096, Lindner, Florian, Ryvkin, Dmitry ORCID: 0000-0001-9314-5441 and Sutter, Matthias ORCID: 0000-0002-6143-8706 (2015). Strive to be first or avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives. Games Econ. Behav., 94. S. 39 - 57. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

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Abstract

We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first, avoid being last, or both. We find that the combined tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top and at the bottom induces the highest effort, especially in larger groups. Avoiding being last produces the lowest variance of effort and is more effective at motivating employees compared to competing for the top. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Dutcher, E. Glenn UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Balafoutas, Loukas UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-3477-5096 UNSPECIFIED Lindner, Florian UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Ryvkin, Dmitry UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-9314-5441 UNSPECIFIED Sutter, Matthias UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-6143-8706 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-388698
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.008
Journal or Publication Title:	Games Econ. Behav.
Volume:	94
Page Range:	S. 39 - 57
Date:	2015
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication:	SAN DIEGO
ISSN:	1090-2473
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language TOURNAMENTS; CONTESTS; COMPENSATION; BEHAVIOR; PRIZES; ENTRY Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/38869