Garcia-Segarra, J. and Gines-Vilar, M. (2015). The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: A strengthening of Roth's result. Oper. Res. Lett., 43 (5). S. 476 - 479. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1872-7468

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Abstract

There is a fundamental tradeoff between Pareto optimality and monotonicity in bargaining games. We show that there exists no solution fulfilling strong Pareto optimality and restricted monotonicity for n >= 3 agents. The result extends the impossibility theorem of Roth (1979) by removing the symmetry axiom. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Garcia-Segarra, J.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Gines-Vilar, M.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-393975
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2015.06.008
Journal or Publication Title: Oper. Res. Lett.
Volume: 43
Number: 5
Page Range: S. 476 - 479
Date: 2015
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Place of Publication: AMSTERDAM
ISSN: 1872-7468
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
BARGAINING PROBLEMMultiple languages
Operations Research & Management ScienceMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/39397

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