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Bergemann, Dirk and Wambach, Achim (2015). Sequential information disclosure in auctions. J. Econ. Theory, 159. S. 1074 - 1096. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1095-7235

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Abstract

We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly determines the allocation and the disclosure policy. A sequential disclosure rule is shown to implement an ascending price auction in which each losing bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder's information is truncated from below. As the auction ends, the winning bidder only has limited information, namely that his valuation is sufficiently high to win the auction. The sequential mechanism implements the allocation of the handicap auction of Eso and Szentes (2007) but strengthens the participation constraints of the bidders from interim to posterior constraints. Due to the limited disclosure of information, the participation constraints (and incentive constraints) of all the bidders are satisfied with respect to all information revealed by the mechanism. In the special case in which the bidders have no private information initially, the seller can extract the entire surplus. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Bergemann, Dirk UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Wambach, Achim UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-394053
DOI:	10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.004
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Theory
Volume:	159
Page Range:	S. 1074 - 1096
Date:	2015
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication:	SAN DIEGO
ISSN:	1095-7235
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language MECHANISM; RESALE Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/39405