Universität zu Köln

Eggers, Daniel (2015). The motivation argument and motivational internalism. Philos. Stud., 172 (9). S. 2445 - 2468. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-0883

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Abstract

Much in contemporary metaethics revolves around the two positions known as 'motivational internalism' and the 'Humean theory of motivation'. The importance of these positions is mostly due to their role in what is considered to be the most powerful argument for metaethical non-cognitivism: the so-called 'motivation argument' (MA). In my paper, I want to argue that widely accepted renditions of the MA, such as the rendition recently forwarded by Russ Shafer-Landau, are flawed in two senses. First, they fail to sufficiently distinguish between conceptual claims and empirical psychological claims, thereby somewhat obscuring the status of the argument and its conclusion. Secondly, they start from definitions of motivational internalism that are, in crucial respects, too strong. Motivational internalism is usually formulated as the claim that moral judgements necessarily motivate; as I want to argue, however, the claim that moral judgements potentially motivate is all the motivational internalism a noncognitivist defender of the MA is ever going to need.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Eggers, Daniel UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-395156
DOI:	10.1007/s11098-014-0420-y
Journal or Publication Title:	Philos. Stud.
Volume:	172
Number:	9
Page Range:	S. 2445 - 2468
Date:	2015
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	DORDRECHT
ISSN:	1573-0883
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language MORAL COGNITIVISM; HUME Multiple languages Philosophy Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/39515