Universität zu Köln

Kovenock, Dan, Morath, Florian and Muenster, Johannes (2015). Information Sharing in Contests. J. Econ. Manage. Strategy, 24 (3). S. 570 - 597. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1530-9134

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Abstract

We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or research and development (R&D). We consider the cases where firms have (i) independent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated. With independent values, an industry-wide agreement to share information can arise in equilibrium. Expected effort is lower with than without information sharing. With common values, an industry-wide agreement to share information never arises in equilibrium. Expected effort is higher with than without information sharing.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Kovenock, Dan UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Morath, Florian UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Muenster, Johannes UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-395981
DOI:	10.1111/jems.12105
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Manage. Strategy
Volume:	24
Number:	3
Page Range:	S. 570 - 597
Date:	2015
Publisher:	WILEY
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1530-9134
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language ALL-PAY AUCTIONS; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; DISCLOSURE; PRIVATE; COURNOT; COMMUNICATION; EQUILIBRIUM; COMPETITION; DUOPOLY; MODEL Multiple languages Economics; Management Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/39598