Universität zu Köln

Ockenfels, Axel ORCID: 0000-0003-1456-0191, Sliwka, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165 and Werner, Peter (2015). Bonus Payments and Reference Point Violations. Manage. Sci., 61 (7). S. 1496 - 1514. CATONSVILLE: INFORMS. ISSN 1526-5501

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Abstract

We investigate how bonus payments affect the satisfaction and performance of managers in a large multinational company. We find that falling behind a natural reference standard for a fair bonus payment (a reference point violation) reduces satisfaction and subsequent performance. The effects are mitigated if information about one's relative standing toward the reference point is withheld. A model and a laboratory experiment provide complementary insights and additional robustness checks.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Ockenfels, Axel UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-1456-0191 UNSPECIFIED Sliwka, Dirk UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-8026-0165 UNSPECIFIED Werner, Peter UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-399671
DOI:	10.1287/mnsc.2014.1949
Journal or Publication Title:	Manage. Sci.
Volume:	61
Number:	7
Page Range:	S. 1496 - 1514
Date:	2015
Publisher:	INFORMS
Place of Publication:	CATONSVILLE
ISSN:	1526-5501
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professur für Economics, Design and Behavior Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language JOB-SATISFACTION; FAIRNESS; PAY; DISAPPOINTMENT; DETERMINANTS; HAPPINESS; DECISION; BEHAVIOR; INCOME; MARKET Multiple languages Management; Operations Research & Management Science Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/39967