Kampkoetter, Patrick (2015). Pay-performance sensitivity of compensation contracts for nonexecutive employees: the case of the financial crisis. Appl. Econ. Lett., 22 (9). S. 734 - 739. ABINGDON: ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD. ISSN 1466-4291

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Abstract

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the appropriateness of bonus payments for employees in the banking and financial services sector has been discussed controversially. While past research has predominantly focused on the pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs or top executive employees, little is known about this relationship for employees below the top executive level. We contribute to the literature by investigating a large sample of German and Swiss banks and find that nonexecutive bonus payments significantly followed firm performance prior to the financial crisis, but this effect vanished in the crisis period. Furthermore, in both periods, the estimated performance sensitivity is higher when negative returns are capped at zero.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Kampkoetter, PatrickUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-401122
DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2014.972542
Journal or Publication Title: Appl. Econ. Lett.
Volume: 22
Number: 9
Page Range: S. 734 - 739
Date: 2015
Publisher: ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
Place of Publication: ABINGDON
ISSN: 1466-4291
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
FIRM PERFORMANCE; INCENTIVESMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/40112

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