Universität zu Köln

Guertler, Oliver and Hoeffler, Felix (2015). MONITORING OF WORKERS AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION: THE ROLE OF WORKS COUNCILS. Econ. Inq., 53 (2). S. 1366 - 1380. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1465-7295

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Abstract

Often the consent of worker representations, such as works councils, is required before firms are allowed to install technologies that monitor workers' behavior. Absent monitoring, workers produce low output, while at the same time receiving an information rent. To gain the works council's consent to the installation of a monitoring technology, firms need to compensate workers for the lost information rent. Hence, by making it more costly to produce high output, works councils can serve firms as an instrument to commit to low output levels. This provides a rationale for why works council rights are not opposed more strongly by employers. (JEL D43, D86, J83, L13)

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Guertler, Oliver UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Hoeffler, Felix UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-408936
DOI:	10.1111/ecin.12182
Journal or Publication Title:	Econ. Inq.
Volume:	53
Number:	2
Page Range:	S. 1366 - 1380
Date:	2015
Publisher:	WILEY
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1465-7295
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language INCENTIVES Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/40893