Universität zu Köln

Gürtler, Oliver ORCID: 0000-0001-7792-5325 (2014). MORAL HAZARD, RISK AVERSION AND EFFICIENCY. Bulletin of Economic Research, 66. 5104-S109. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1467-8586

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Abstract

This note revisits the classic moral-hazard model, but assumes that the output distribution has moving support and punishments are limited. The results show that the principal can implement an efficient solution if the agent is sufficiently risk averse.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Gürtler, Oliver UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-7792-5325 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-421101
DOI:	10.1111/boer.12021
Journal or Publication Title:	Bulletin of Economic Research
Volume:	66
Page Range:	5104-S109
Date:	2014
Publisher:	WILEY
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1467-8586
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Economics
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language Economics English
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/42110