Guertler, Oliver (2014). MORAL HAZARD, RISK AVERSION AND EFFICIENCY. Bull Econ. Res., 66. S. S104 - 6. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1467-8586

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Abstract

This note revisits the classic moral-hazard model, but assumes that the output distribution has moving support and punishments are limited. The results show that the principal can implement an efficient solution if the agent is sufficiently risk averse.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Guertler, OliverUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-421101
DOI: 10.1111/boer.12021
Journal or Publication Title: Bull Econ. Res.
Volume: 66
Page Range: S. S104 - 6
Date: 2014
Publisher: WILEY
Place of Publication: HOBOKEN
ISSN: 1467-8586
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/42110

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