Ockenfels, Axel and Werner, Peter (2014). Beliefs and ingroup favoritism. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 108. S. 453 - 463. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

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Abstract

We report on two experiments designed to investigate the role of beliefs for ingroup favoritism. On average, dictators transfer substantially more to recipients who are publicly known to share the same group identity, compared to transfers given to recipients who are publicly known to be outgroup matches. However, there is substantially less ingroup favoritism if the dictator is informed that the recipient is unaware of the shared group membership. Moreover, dictators tend to ask less often for information about a recipient's identity if disclosure would imply that the dictator's identity is also disclosed to the recipient. The evidence supports the view that ingroup favoritism is partly belief-dependent, in addition to the notion that shared group identity per se changes charity preferences. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Ockenfels, AxelUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Werner, PeterUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-421139
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.003
Journal or Publication Title: J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume: 108
Page Range: S. 453 - 463
Date: 2014
Publisher: ELSEVIER
Place of Publication: AMSTERDAM
ISSN: 1879-1751
Language: English
Faculty: Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions: Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professur für Economics, Design and Behavior
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
SOCIAL IDENTITY; GROUP AFFILIATION; GROUP MEMBERSHIP; GUILT; ALTRUISM; BIAS; NORMMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/42113

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