Universität zu Köln

Kampkoetter, Patrick and Sliwka, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165 (2014). Wage premia for newly hired employees. Labour Econ., 31. S. 45 - 61. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1879-1034

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Abstract

We investigate wage differences between newly hired and incumbent employees in identical functions using detailed personnel data from a large number of banks. We first show in a formal model of job switching that (i) incumbents earn less than new recruits when human capital is mostly general but (ii) the opposite is the case if specific human capital is sufficiently important In the empirical analysis we find that, on average, new hires earn more than comparable incumbents but - using a novel measure for the importance of specific human capital - these wage premia indeed strongly depend on human capital specificity. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Kampkoetter, Patrick UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Sliwka, Dirk UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-8026-0165 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-421321
DOI:	10.1016/j.labeco.2014.09.001
Journal or Publication Title:	Labour Econ.
Volume:	31
Page Range:	S. 45 - 61
Date:	2014
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1879-1034
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language LABOR-MARKET; EXTERNAL RECRUITMENT; INTERNAL PROMOTION; SENIORITY; MOBILITY; SEARCH; COUNTEROFFERS; DISTRIBUTIONS; COMPENSATION; EFFICIENCY Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/42132