Universität zu Köln

Sauermann, Jan ORCID: 0000-0002-7673-6407 and Glassmann, Ulrich (2014). Restraining free-riders: The effects of actor types and decision rules in the public goods game. Ration. Soc., 26 (3). S. 290 - 320. LONDON: SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD. ISSN 1461-7358

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Abstract

Many experiments comparing individual and group behavior find that groups behave more egoistically than individuals. However, most of these studies do not control for the influence of within-group decision-making rules that might have an important impact on group behavior. In this article, we report findings from laboratory experiments comparing individual and group behavior in a public goods game. We find that rather than cooperation levels differing between individuals and groups per se, the intragroup decision-making rule has an influence on the cooperativeness of groups. Groups decide either by majority or unanimity rule. While groups deciding by majority rule reach roughly the same level of cooperation as individuals, groups deciding by unanimity rule contribute significantly lower amounts to the public good.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Sauermann, Jan UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-7673-6407 UNSPECIFIED Glassmann, Ulrich UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-432799
DOI:	10.1177/1043463114533073
Journal or Publication Title:	Ration. Soc.
Volume:	26
Number:	3
Page Range:	S. 290 - 320
Date:	2014
Publisher:	SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD
Place of Publication:	LONDON
ISSN:	1461-7358
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language INTERGROUP DISCONTINUITY; GROUP POLARIZATION; PERSONALITY; CONFLICT; COOPERATION Multiple languages Sociology Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/43279