Universität zu Köln

Gretschko, Vitali and Wambach, Achim (2014). Information acquisition during a descending auction. Econ. Theory, 55 (3). S. 731 - 752. NEW YORK: SPRINGER. ISSN 1432-0479

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Abstract

We compare the effects of information acquisition during a descending auction with its static counterpart, the first-price sealed-bid auction. In a framework with heterogeneous prior information, we show that an equilibrium with information acquisition exists in both auction formats. We show that everything else equal information acquisition is more desirable in the dynamic auction. Moreover, we characterize a set of parameter values where more information is acquired in the dynamic auction in equilibrium. If the costs of information acquisition are sufficiently low, the sealed-bid auction generates more revenue although the descending auction is more efficient.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Gretschko, Vitali UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Wambach, Achim UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-441845
DOI:	10.1007/s00199-013-0766-y
Journal or Publication Title:	Econ. Theory
Volume:	55
Number:	3
Page Range:	S. 731 - 752
Date:	2014
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	1432-0479
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language DUTCH AUCTIONS Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/44184